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WAIT! THAT’S NOT WHAT WE MEANT BY 
CIVIL SOCIETY!: QUESTIONING THE NGO 
ORTHODOXY IN WEST AFRICA 
Thomas Kelley* 
INTRODUCTION 
mong those whose vocations or avocations involve spreading de-
mocracy and market driven prosperity1 to the developing world, it 
has long been an article of faith that creating a vibrant, highly 
ing civil society is a necessary (some would say the necessary) precursor. 
This Article focuses on the complicated and messy business of promot-
ing civil society in Africa, Muslim West Africa in particular. 
I assume, and this Article argues, that when we—people and institu-
tions from the Global North2—envisage civil society in Africa, we pic-
ture citizens forming voluntary non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) and then sitting around conference tables (perhaps the most 
culturally attuned among us include visions of people sitting in circles 
under village trees) debating and passing resolutions that will advance 
women’s rights, the rights of minority groups, protections for children 
and other vulnerable members of society, environmental justice, freedom 
of expression, due process, and the rule of law.3 
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 1. Alison Van Rooy & Mark Robinson, Out of the Ivory Tower: Civil Society and 
the Aid System, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE AID INDUSTRY 31, 36–37 (Alison Van Rooy 
ed., 1998) [hereinafter CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE AID INDUSTRY] (stating that promotion of 
democracy and promotion of economic development are the two major aims of the civil 
society movement, and that improved economic performance is assumed to be a byprod-
uct of strong civil society). 
 2. Throughout this Article I employ the terms “Global North” and “West” inter-
changeably and somewhat loosely to refer to the wealthy countries of the world—and the 
institutions that they control—that dominate international development. I realize fully 
that the salience of these terms is fading as China and other non-western countries exert 
ever greater influence in Africa and other parts of the developing world. 
 3. Indeed, the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, has traveled 
the world recently delivering the good word that civil society “undergirds both democrat-
ic governance and broad-based prosperity.” See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of 
State, Civil Society: Supporting Democracy in the 21st Century, Community of Democ-
racies, Krakow Poland (July 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143952.htm. When she specifies the civil 
society actors she has in mind, she tends to refer to “organizations . . . fighting for justice 
and law, or clean and open government, or public health, or a safe environment, or honest 
elections . . . .” Id.; see also Wachira Maina, Kenya: The State, Donors and the Politics of 
A
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What we of the Global North do not picture in our collective concep-
tion of civil society, and what we are not prepared to deal with, is groups 
of Islamic imams crowding into the public square agitating for norms and 
laws that would, among other things, deny women equal inheritance 
rights or the right to marry without elder males’ permission. Yet, this is 
precisely what has happened across Islamic West Africa, partly as a re-
sult of Western-inspired reforms that were intended to bolster civil socie-
ty. The civil society sector that we envisioned and helped engineer in 
poor countries across Africa has been occupied by nongovernmental ac-
tors whose visions of a just society diverge radically from our own. The 
question that this Article begins to answer is what if anything we in the 
Global North ought to do about it. 
Because this Article is linked to a symposium, I feel obligated to draw 
an explicit connection to the theme of Governing Civil Society: Linking 
NGO Legitimacy to Nonprofit Accountability. If civil society is to have 
any meaning and any efficacy in non-Western societies and states, it will 
have to develop its own peculiarities in its own social and political con-
text. Ultimately, civil society in far away countries will probably look 
very little like civil society in the United States or Western Europe. Ef-
forts to transplant U.S.-generated norms and “best practices” on nonprof-
it governance and accountability to civil society actors in Africa and oth-
er parts of the developing world are probably a waste of time. Just as Af-
ricans will have to develop their own civil society, they will have to de-
velop their own norms concerning the proper governance of its constitu-
ent members. And that may take a long time. 
In pursuit of that argument, Part I of this paper examines what we 
mean by civil society and concludes that, though it means many things to 
many people, a core conception shared by most donor countries and 
Northern multilateral organizations and NGOs is that it is, or at least 
should be, comprised of high functioning voluntary associations dedicat-
ed to protecting universal human rights and upholding democracy. Stated 
more precisely, civil society in poor countries should look a lot like the 
nonprofit sector in the United States and the voluntary sector in Europe. 
Part II offers examples of how our plans for civil society in Africa, par-
ticularly in Islamic West Africa, have gone awry. A brief preview of that 
story is that the US and its Global North allies encouraged law reform 
that would create a social space for the growth of a civil society sector, 
but Muslim social reformers rushed into that social space and successful-
                                                                                                             
Democratization, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE AID INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 134, 137–38 
(arguing that Western promoters of civil society in Africa have a narrow, culturally de-
termined view of what constitutes legitimate civil society). 
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ly launched popular efforts to institute Islamic norms and practices. Part 
III grapples briefly with the question of what we should do about it, and 
concludes that our best course is to permit divergent visions of civil soci-
ety to take root in countries that are historically and culturally different 
from our own. 
I. CIVIL SOCIETY: A PROTEAN CONCEPT BECOMES A KEYSTONE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Civil society means many things to many people. Accounts of its ori-
gins and evolution have become numerous in recent years, typically be-
ginning with Ancient Rome (where the term civil society described civi-
lized people organizing their public affairs through a polis), continuing to 
a revival of the concept during the eighteenth century Scottish Enlight-
enment (where it was conceptualized as a check on the power of the 
state), nodding to the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci (who saw 
it as the sphere in which battles for and against capitalism were fought), 
and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Eastern 
Bloc, and the international flowering of democracy propelled by citizens’ 
voluntary associations.4 
For purposes of this brief Article, we pick up the story of civil society 
at its last chapter as the Cold War was coming to an end. At that time—
in the late 1980s through the 1990s—civil society became “one of the big 
ideas of the millennial moment,”5 a “key element in the post-Cold War 
zeitgeist.”6 The Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended, and the develop-
ment of civil society was declared essential to the Western project of cre-
ating democracy and prosperity across the world, including Africa.7 
                                                                                                             
 4. For a comprehensive and nicely written account of the history of the term “civil 
society,” see Alison Van Rooy, Civil Society as Idea: An Analytical Hatstand?, in CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND THE AID INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 6–24 [hereinafter Van Rooy, Civil So-
ciety as Idea]. For an entertainingly sardonic version of the same story, see John L. Co-
maroff & Jean Comaroff, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL 
IMAGINATION IN AFRICA 1–22 (John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff eds., 1999) [hereinaf-
ter CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN AFRICA]. 
 5. Comaroff & Comaroff, Preface, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL 
IMAGINATION IN AFRICA, supra note 4, at vii [hereinafter Comaroff & Comaroff, Pref-
ace]. 
 6. Thomas Carothers, Civil Society: Think Again, FOREIGN POL’Y 19 (1999). 
 7. See Naomi Chazan, Africa’s Democratic Challenge, 9 WORLD POL’Y J. 279, 280 
(1992). The civil society notion received a boost from the work of Robert Putnam, who 
studied democracy in small towns in northern Italy and concluded that it functioned well 
there because the inhabitants of the small towns had built up a store of what he called 
“social capital.” Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, America’s Declining Social Capital, J. 
DEMOCRACY 61, 67 (1995). He warned that associational life in the U.S. was losing its 
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At an operational level, building civil society became the marching or-
ders for a vast array of institutional actors engaged in international de-
velopment work.8  American development institutions such as USAID 
began churning out reports and making grants to engender civil society.9 
Even international finance institutions such as the World Bank, whose 
core missions were not supposed to involve democracy building and so-
cial engineering,10 began including civil society in their programs and 
reports.11 
                                                                                                             
vibrancy, and that a decline in associational life would reduce our social capital and un-
dermine our democracy. See id. at 67–70. 
 8. Nelson Kasfir, The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique, in CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES  2 (Nelson Kasfir ed., 
1998); Stephen N. Ndegwa, THE TWO FACES OF CIVIL SOCIETY: NGOS AND POLITICS IN 
AFRICA 2, 15 (1996); see also Alan Whaites, Let’s Get Civil Society Straight: NGOs, the 
State, and Political Theory, in DEVELOPMENT, NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 124, 126 (Debo-
rah Eade ed., 2000) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT, NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY] (arguing that  
it has become a development industry orthodoxy that development, particularly efforts to 
create good governance in the developing world, should be undertaken through civil so-
ciety). 
 9. See GARY HANSEN, CONSTITUENCIES FOR REFORM: STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR 
DONOR-SUPPORTED CIVIC ADVOCACY GROUPS (USAID Program and Operations Assess-
ment Report No. 12) (1996), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/constitue
ncies.pdf (stating “a core component of USAID’s democracy and governance agenda is 
support for strengthening civil society”). 
 10. See generally NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK 
AND THEIR BORROWERS (2006) (examining the role of the IMF and the World Bank in 
international relations). A slightly more cynical version of this explanation points out that 
the international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF that have 
taken the lead in implementing the law-as-technology approach are forbidden by their 
charters from straying into the realm of politics, whereas nothing prevents them from 
being involved in technology transfer. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, 
LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 20–21, 209 (2008). They therefore adopt, 
consciously or unconsciously, strained definitions of law that permit them to take what 
they view as appropriate action. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, FRAGILE STATES—GOOD PRACTICE IN COUNTRY 
ASSISTANCE STRATEGIES 5–6 (2005), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/12/22/00009034
1_20051222094709/Rendered/PDF/34790.pdf; THE CIVIL SOCIETY FUND OF THE WORLD 
BANK GROUP, SMALL GRANTS BIG RESULTS: SMALL GRANTS PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2008 7–8 (2008), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSMALLGRANTS/Resources/CSFAnnualReport2
008.pdf (describing small grants intended to spur civic engagement and listing various 
targeted civil society groups). 
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The aid industry presumed a causal connection between a thriving civil 
society, democratization, and economic prosperity.12 When talking about 
Africa, some Western experts explain the causation as economic liberali-
zation leading to a powerful middle class, which protects its interests by 
forming robust civil society, giving rise in turn, to stable democracy.13 
Others place civil society first in this causation cascade; a thriving civil 
society gives rise to healthy democracy, which creates the conditions for 
long-term economic development.14 No matter the details of the causal 
explanation, it has become accepted wisdom that civil society plays a 
vital role in creating democracy and long-term prosperity.15 
Given policy makers’ and aid experts’ unbounded enthusiasm for civil 
society, its definition is surprisingly hazy and malleable.16 A USAID 
study on civil society defines it somewhat tautologically as “nonstate 
organizations that can act as a catalyst for democratic reform[,]”17 imply-
ing that democratic reform is the sole or primary reason for civil socie-
ty’s existence. A more flexible (and typical) definition of civil society, 
attributed to the noted civil society theorist Larry Diamond, is “the vol-
untary and self-supporting legally ordered social space between govern-
ment and market where citizens act collectively to express opinions, con-
cerns, and demands, especially pertaining to the state.”18 The noted an-
thropologists, Jean and John Comaroff, apply their disciplinary perspec-
tive to civil society and define it as “a public sphere, separated from 
                                                                                                             
 12. See generally Van Rooy & Robinson, supra note 1, at 36–37 (stating that the two 
primary goals of civil society projects are promotion of democracy and promotion of 
economic development, and that improved economic performance is generally assumed 
in the civil society literature to be a byproduct of strong civil society). 
 13. Maina, supra note 3, at 154. 
 14. Van Rooy & Robinson, supra note 1, at 36. 
 15. Id. at 44–50 (reviewing various popular theories explaining why civil society 
bolsters democracy). 
 16. Comaroff & Comaroff, Preface, supra note 5, at viii, 6 (arguing that the concept 
of civil society was revived after the Cold War and that it has come to mean all things to 
all people); see also MICHAELLE L. BROWERS, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN ARAB 
POLITICAL THOUGHT: TRANSCULTURAL POSSIBILITIES 6 (2006) (arguing that those who 
invoke civil society often attempt “to insinuate theoretical and ideological assumptions 
into their analysis, stressing particular aspects of the notion as well as different historical 
sources and traditions, as suit the writer’s purposes”). 
 17. See HANSEN, supra note 9. 
 18. Simon Stacey & Sada Aksartova, The Foundations of Democracy: U.S. Founda-
tion Support for Civil Society in South Africa, 1988–96, 12 VOLUNTAS 373, 383 (2002) 
(citing Larry J. Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation, 
5 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 3, 1994 at 4–17). 
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church or government, perceived as an impersonal, self-regulating site 
for the pursuit of voluntaristic civic action . . . .”19 
It is noteworthy that civil society practitioners and theorists disagree on 
whether religion falls within its ambit.20 Some exclude religious organi-
zations,21 viewing them as a type of primordial attachment, akin to clan 
and tribal affiliation, that can have no place in a highly functioning civil 
society in the context of a modern democracy.22 Others include religious 
organizations in their civil society definitions,23 but almost always limit 
their discussion to Christian organizations24 and, even then, generally 
mention them only as an afterthought. 
Non-Christian religions, particularly Islam, are portrayed implicitly, 
and sometimes explicitly, as antithetical to civil society.25 Although some 
commentators argue forcefully that Islam is compatible with democratic 
governance and civil society,26 many hold the opposite view.27 Addition-
                                                                                                             
 19. Comaroff & Comaroff, Preface, supra note 5, at viii. 
 20. See Comaroff & Comaroff, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL 
IMAGINATION IN AFRICA, supra note 5, at 6–7 [hereinafter Comaroff & Comaroff, Intro-
duction]; see also Van Rooy & Robinson, supra note 2, at 57–58 (arguing that there is no 
shared understanding among donors about the specific types of organizations that consti-
tute civil society, and noting that different divisions of USAID emphasize different sorts 
of organizations); Amy S. Patterson, A Reappraisal of Democracy in Civil Society: Evi-
dence From Rural Senegal, 36 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 423 (1998) (citing Michael Walzer, 
The Idea of Civil Society, in 38 DISSENT 293 (1991)). 
 21. See Whaites, supra note 9, at 127–29 (arguing that associations based on “pri-
mordial attachments” such as tribal affiliation and religion ought not be considered part 
of civil society); see also Dorothea E. Schulz, Political Factions, Ideological Fictions: 
The Controversy Over Family Law Reform in Democratic Mali, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 
132, 160 (2003) (arguing that many Western oriented civil society organizations involved 
in democratization debates in Mali did not consider Islamic actors as legitimate partici-
pants). 
 22. Whaites, supra note 8, at 129. 
 23. See Carothers, supra note 6, at 19–20; see also Patterson, supra note 21, at 423. 
 24. Maina, supra note 3, at 146–49. 
 25. See Comaroff & Comaroff, Introduction, supra note 20, at 19; see also Naomi 
Chazan, Africa’s Democratic Challenge, 9 WORLD POL’Y J. 279, 287 (1992) (claiming 
that Islamic religious organizations fall outside of civil society, partly because they “seek 
to take over the state”); Dale F. Eickelman, Islam and the Languages of Modernity, 129 
DEADALUS 119, 120 (2000) (summarizing various arguments about why Islamic organ-
izations should not be included in the concept of civil society). 
 26. See Eickelman, supra note 25, at 132 (arguing that Islam, in its multiple and con-
tested forms, can and should act as a vibrant part of civil society). See generally Robert 
W. Hefner, Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization, 62 SOC. RELIGION 491, 
498 (2001) (arguing that modern interpretations of Islamic scriptures have increasingly 
accepted freedom and democracy as Islamic endowments). 
 27. See, e.g., Charles K. Rowley & Nathanael Smith, Islam’s Democracy Paradox: 
Muslims Claim to Like Democracy, so Why Do They Have so Little?, 139 PUB. CHOICE 
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ally, many majority Muslim countries undergoing democratic transfor-
mations continue to debate whether or not Islamic leaders are legitimate 
members of civil society entitled to a seat at the table when deciding the 
rules that will govern their societies.28 
If there is disagreement over whether religious organizations have a 
role to play in civil society, there is virtual unanimity, at least among 
Global North actors, that NGOs are vital. In fact, although definitions of 
civil society rarely say so explicitly, those who implement and comment 
on civil society initiatives often conflate the two and simply assume that 
when we talk about spurring the growth of civil society in developing 
countries, we in fact are talking about developing those countries’ NGO 
sectors.29 
There are at least two reasons that Global North actors consider NGOs 
as either essential to or the alter ego of civil society.30 The first is cultural 
and historical. Stated bluntly, wealthy actors from the Global North often 
are convinced, based on their own historical experience and political phi-
losophy, that a rich associational life, by which they generally mean a 
thriving NGO sector, is the key to healthy democracy.31 Americans and 
Europeans who consider their societies as the apogee of democratic evo-
lution, and who observe the central role that the NGO sectors played in 
the development of their own democracies, naturally assume that poor 
countries will follow them down the same democratic path if they can 
construct a civil society sector “akin to what we have in Western Europe 
and North America.”32 
A second reason that NGOs migrated to the center of civil society and 
democracy and governance strategies is that actors in the Global North 
began to view them as vehicles for addressing the problem of failed 
states in the developing world, particularly in Africa. Soon after inde-
pendence in the early 1960s, Africa succumbed to strongman leadership, 
and by the late 1980s and early 90s, many African states were in full 
                                                                                                             
273 (2009) (arguing that democratic deficits in Muslim-majority countries have to do 
with Islam itself). 
 28. Schulz, supra note 21, at 160. 
 29. Van Rooy, Civil Society as Idea, supra note 4, at 6, 15–16 (arguing that among 
development practitioners civil society is synonymous with NGOs). 
 30. See Kasfir, supra note 8, at 2, 5 (arguing that commentators and development 
professionals generally assume that NGOs are the constituent members of civil society). 
 31. See Mikael Karlström, Civil Society and Its Presuppositions: Lessons from Ugan-
da, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN AFRICA, supra note 4, at 104, 
115; see also Maina, supra note 3, at 139 (arguing the prevailing conceptions of civil 
society reveal a strong Western bias). 
 32. Stacey & Aksartova, supra note 18, at 382 (quoting the Soros Foundation’s de-
scription of an “open society”). 
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blown crisis.33 At the same time, the Northern development community 
was looking for new partners to carry out its post-Cold War development 
agenda of democracy and economic liberalization. 34  Donors came to 
view NGOs, whether preexisting or created by the donor organizations, 
as magic bullets that could solve many of the problems and address many 
of the deficiencies of African states.35 The NGOs could act as institution-
al substitutes for weak African states in the grand project of democratiza-
tion and economic development36 and, simultaneously, could act as bul-
warks against backsliding states and venal state actors straining to hold 
on to power.37 
When Western development experts described the ameliorative bene-
fits of NGOs, they had a particular sort of NGO in mind, even if they did 
not say so. What they meant was advocacy organizations, led by West-
ern-oriented intellectuals, lawyers, entrepreneurs, academics, and teach-
ers,38 all devoted to public interest causes such as the environment, hu-
                                                                                                             
 33. Maina, supra note 3, at 153. 
 34. See Ndegwa, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that development organizations viewed 
states as stumbling blocks to development and tried to avoid them by channeling aid 
through NGOs). 
 35. William Cunningham Bissell, Colonial Constructions: Historicizing Debates on 
Civil Society in Africa, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN AFRICA, 
supra note 4, at 124, 124; see also Maina, supra note 3, at 134 (referring to the aid indus-
try’s assumption that civil society would be the “midwife of democracy” in Africa); 
Stacey & Aksartova, supra note 18, at 373, 375 (claiming that U.S. private foundations 
came to believe that civil society was essential to democracy in the post Cold War devel-
oping world). 
 36. Johanna Kalb, The Institutional Ecology of NGOs: Applying Hansmann to Inter-
national Development, TEX. INT’L L.J. 295, 297 (2006); see also Chazan, supra note 25, 
at 286 (linking the West’s imposition of structural adjustment programs, with their em-
phasis on shrinking states, with the rise of the NGO sector in Africa); Maina, supra note 
3, at 134 (arguing that building civil society emerged in the 1990s as a corrective to dere-
lict African states and a general air of Afropessimism); Mick Moore & Sheelagh Stewart, 
Corporate Governance for NGOs?, in DEVELOPMENT, NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra 
note 8, at 80 (noting that bilateral and multilateral donors avoided states and switched 
their development budgets to NGOs). 
 37. See generally Patterson, supra note 20, at 423 (describing the West’s focus on 
civil society in Africa as the key to democratization and stability); see also Comaroff & 
Comaroff, Introduction, supra note 20, at 18–24 (arguing that because the organizations 
of civil society promote democratic values among their members, they are able to chal-
lenge repressive state actions and facilitate democratic development); Van Rooy & Rob-
inson, supra note 1, at 49–50 (arguing that many proponents of civil society in develop-
ing countries view it as the sector where citizens learn the habits and skills of democratic 
participation). 
 38. Comaroff & Comaroff, Introduction, supra note 20, at 19. 
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man rights,39 women’s issues, election monitoring, anti-corruption, and 
other things that we in the Global North tend to applaud.40 
Though this implicit vision was perfectly in harmony with the West’s 
historical experience, or at least its own narrative describing its historical 
experience, it generated problems when implemented in Africa. One 
stemmed from the elitism inherent in the NGOs favored by Western aid 
agencies. Such organizations typically were and are dominated by edu-
cated, western oriented citizens who have only tenuous ties to those citi-
zens whose interests they claim to represent.41 Little of the language42 
and few of the techniques employed by such organizations arise from the 
grassroots of the subject countries.43 
Another problem resulting from Western donors’ narrow (and self-
referential) focus on NGOs as the key to prosperity and democracy in 
Africa is that many important and potentially efficacious forms of public 
associational life are excluded.44 Western commentators on NGOs and 
civil society tend to ignore organizations and institutions that do not fo-
cus on the defense of individual rights45 or that do not directly engage the 
                                                                                                             
 39. Van Rooy & Robinson, supra note 1, at 40 (stating that in international aid cir-
cles, civil society is often conflated with human rights). 
 40. Id. at 16; Carothers, supra note 6, at 19; see also Maina, supra note 3, at 159–60 
(arguing that theorizing on civil society in Africa views “good” civil society as profes-
sional groups, human rights lobbying organizations, law reform organizations, and the 
church, and that in Kenya, those groups receive the lion’s share of Western civil society 
funding); Ndegwa, supra note 8, at 3 (describing the typical work of NGOs in Africa as 
civic education and election and human rights monitoring). 
 41. Carothers, supra note 6, at 20; see also Comaroff & Comaroff, Introduction, su-
pra note 20, at 19. See generally, Kalb, supra note 36, at 303 (arguing that educated elites 
seek jobs in the NGO sector of developing countries because the pay and stability are 
better than the civil service or private sector); Ndegwa, supra note 8, at 3–5 (arguing that 
African NGOs typically are run by elites who are out of touch with grassroots concerns 
and that they depend almost entirely on external funding from donor countries); Maina, 
supra note 3, at 158 (arguing that Western aid money goes to the usual NGO suspects, 
many of which are run by Western oriented lawyers). 
 42. Maina, supra note 3, at 162 (arguing that most of the language employed by host 
country NGOs is fed to it by the donor countries and their development agencies, includ-
ing the concepts of “empowerment” and “aid re-engineering”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Kasfir, supra note 8, at 5; see also Maina, supra note 3, at 137–38 (arguing that 
much associational life in Africa occurs outside of formal organizational life in ethnic 
and religious organizations). 
 45. See generally Elizabeth Garland, Developing Bushmen: Building Civil(ized) Soci-
ety in the Kalahari and Beyond, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN 
AFRICA, supra note 4, at 72, 72–77 (discussing whether civil society is a Western con-
struct inapplicable to non-Western societies that do not conceive of society as composed 
of individuals versus a powerful state). 
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state in ways that enhance its democratic character.46 They tend not to 
realize or acknowledge that much associational life in African societies 
and much of African’s social organization happens in places that are ge-
ographically and culturally distant from the state.47 Thus, donor coun-
tries’ and development agencies’ narrow focus on Western-oriented 
NGOs ruled out a significant role for traditional African social institu-
tions such as clans,48 tribal associations,49 the chefferrie,50 and, as dis-
cussed later, Islamic religious organizations.51 
To summarize, the quest to engender civil society in the developing 
world has migrated to the center of the Global North’s development 
agenda. But even as enthusiasm for civil society has become ubiquitous, 
no common working definition has emerged. At an operational level, 
however, where development agencies go about the business of stimulat-
ing the growth of civil society, a tacit set of definitional concepts has 
evolved. When development actors say civil society, they generally mean 
NGOs organized and run by western-oriented elites, if not westerners 
themselves, working to implement democracy and universal human 
rights. In Africa, this narrow working definition has limited the effec-
tiveness of civil society development programs and, as discussed in the 
next Section, has given rise to unintended consequences. 
                                                                                                             
 46. Karlström, supra note 31, at 105. 
 47. Admittedly, there are a few prominent counter examples where Western states 
and their proxies have celebrated and supported traditional, non-state institutions. Perhaps 
the most celebrated example was the West’s support for Rwanda’s use of traditional 
gacaca courts in adjudicating suspected participants in that country’s 1992 genocide. See 
Marc Lacey, After the Horror, Truth and Some Healing, Maybe, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2002, at A4 (reporting favorably on the institution of gacaca courts in Rwanda). 
 48. Karlström, supra note 31, at 107. 
 49. Maina, supra note 3, at 159. 
 50. This is a French term that refers to the traditional chieftaincy. See Thomas Kelley, 
Squeezing Parakeets into Pigeon Holes: The Effects of Globalization and State Legal 
Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 635, 653–55. 
 51. See Comaroff & Comaroff, Introduction, supra note 20, at 20–22 (arguing that 
policy makers have ignored the potential for Africanized modes of civil society that 
might incorporate and build off of kin based and ethnic organizations); see also Van 
Rooy, Civil Society as Idea, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that many associations in Africa 
are excluded from working definitions of civil society because they are “ascriptive” ra-
ther than truly voluntary). 
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II. CIVIL SOCIETY EVOLVES IN UNEXPECTED DIRECTIONS IN WEST 
AFRICA 
A. Western-Oriented Elites Start Down the Path of Civil Society and 
Democracy 
The 1990s was a time of political ferment across West Africa. As the 
shockwaves from the fall of the Berlin Wall spread across the region, 
countries attempted with varying success to shed their authoritarian pasts 
and institute democratic reforms with civil society at the core.52 The il-
lustrative example that follows focuses primarily on the West African 
Republic of Niger, partly because its experience with civil society and 
democratization is typical among Islamic African countries, and partly 
because it is the West African country with which I am most familiar. 
Western Africa is rife with numerous similar examples, though, includ-
ing Senegal, Mali, and somewhat to the north, Morocco. 
In the early 1990s, Nigerien democracy activists composed largely of 
Western-oriented intellectuals, students, and labor activists53 compelled 
the military regime then in power to convene a national conference that 
would, in theory, negotiate and agree upon scaffolding for the country’s 
democratic future.54 The conference quickly declared itself sovereign and 
assumed the task of drafting a new democratic constitution and adopting 
a series of legal codes that it considered fundamental to any democratic 
society.55 At a minimum, the conference intended to adopt laws govern-
ing the operation of the electoral system, private ownership of land, free-
dom of expression and the press, and family life.56 However, it quickly 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Leonardo A. Villalón, From Argument to Negotiation: Constructing Democ-
racy in African Muslim Contexts 6–7 (Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Villalón, Argument to 
Negotiation] (unpublished discussion paper) (on file with author) (describing the interac-
tion of democracy and Islam in Niger, Senegal, and Mali). See generally MINISTERE DE 
L’ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, IMPLICATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE DANS LA GESTION DES 
AFFAIRES PUBLIQUES POUR UNE BONNE GOUVERNANCE AU NIGER 32–34 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter NIGER MINISTER OF FINANCE REPORT ON CIVIL SOCIETY] (a report funded by the Unit-
ed Nations Development Fund) (on file with author) (describing how civil society organi-
zations in Niger inserted themselves into the center of democracy struggles in the early 
1990s). 
 53. Leonardo Villalón, The Moral and the Political in African Democratization: The 
Code de la Famille in Niger’s Troubled Transition, 3 DEMOCRATIZATION 41, 54 (1996) 
[hereinafter Villalón, Moral and the Political]; see also Chazan, supra note 25, at 279–80 
(noting that political liberalization across Africa in the early 1990s was often led by civil 
servants, students, professional organizations, trade unions, and churches). 
 54. Villalón, Moral and the Political, supra note 53, at 41. 
 55. Id. at 48. 
 56. Id. 
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became bogged down in practical and political disagreements, and much 
of its ambitious legal agenda was left to be worked out by the post-
conference, democratically elected government.57 
The fundamental meaning of democracy and the details of democratic 
governance were hotly contested in Niger, but from the start there was 
broad consensus, at least among Western-oriented leaders, about the fact 
that democracy necessarily includes the liberalization of the public 
sphere.58 This meant freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free-
dom of association, and the new constitution and statutes established 
those rights as part of the DNA of the emerging democratic state.59 
For philosophical and practical reasons described in the previous Sec-
tion, democracy proponents and their Western sponsors did not stop at 
enshrining general rights of expression. They also passed laws explicitly 
intended to facilitate and spur the development of civil society in Niger.60 
Most fundamentally, Niger’s new constitution explicitly provided its cit-
izens the right to form political parties and other voluntary associations.61 
Further, statutes that had originally been enacted by a military regime in 
the 1980s were updated to provide a solid legal existence to voluntary 
associations, a comparatively streamlined process for registering them, 
and a dedicated government office to oversee them.62 Unofficial lists of 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
 58. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 10. 
 59. See Villalón, Moral and the Political, supra note 53, at 48; see also 
CONSTITUTION OF NIGER (1999), tit. II (enumerating various individual rights including 
the right to free expression). 
 60. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 11 (referring to the “official 
recognition of voluntary social life” in Niger); see also Gestion Participative et Dé-
mocratie Associative (Feb. 2001) (a pamphlet, funded by the United States Government, 
explaining good governance principles for civil society actors) (copy on file with the 
author); Renforcement de la Capacité de la Société Civile (Feb. 2001) (a pamphlet, fund-
ed by the United States government, explaining among other things the vital role of civil 
society in a democracy) (copy on file with the author). 
 61. CONSTITUTION OF NIGER (1999), tit. II, art. 9. 
 62. See generally Ordonnance no. 84-06 du 1ermars 1984 portant regime des Associ-
ations (modifiée par l’ordonnance n°84-50 du 5 décembre 1984 et la loi n°91-006 du 20 
mai 1991) [Ordinance no. 84-06 of March 1, 1984 Ordinance Governing Associations, 
Amended by Ordinance No. 84-50 of December 5, 1984 and Law No. 91-006 of May 20, 
1991] (Republique du Niger) (laying out a restrictive scheme to create a narrow, con-
trolled existence for voluntary associations); CONSTITUTION OF NIGER (1999), tit. II, art. 
15 (further restricting the activities of student associations); Id. tit. II, arts. 17–18 (explic-
itly permitting foreigners to form voluntary associations in Niger); Id. tit. II, art. 21 (rec-
ognizing organizations non gouvermentales, or NGOs, as a subset of voluntary associa-
tions that are “animated by a spirit of voluntarism that they carry out in the service of 
others and where its aims are the support of development through social and/or economic 
activities”); Decret no 92–292/PM/MF/P du 25 septembre 1992, portant modalities 
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new voluntary associations indicate that while a handful of new NGOs 
completed the registration process each year in the early and mid-1990s, 
in 1998 fifty-two new organizations registered, and between 2000 and 
2003, 237 new organizations were officially formed.63 Many of these 
organizations were formed with the hope of influencing the ongoing de-
bate about what Nigerien democracy should look like.64 
B. Islamic Organizations Learn to Love Civil Society 
In accordance with the plans laid in the Global North, the flood of new 
voluntary associations and NGOs included many Western-oriented hu-
man rights organizations. For example, the Association nigerienne pour 
la defense des droits d l’homme (“ANDDH”), is a well established NGO 
populated by lawyers and intellectuals that agitates for universal human 
rights and the rule of law, and Timidria, is funded by Western aid organ-
izations to advocate for human rights protections for the country’s cus-
tomary slaves.65 What Nigerien democracy activists and their Western 
sponsors did not anticipate was that Islamic religious organizations, 
which had only been peripherally involved in the earliest struggles for 
democracy,66 would see a valuable opportunity in this new civil society 
space, and would aggressively seize it.67 
The proliferation of publicly assertive Islamic religious organizations 
was a novel phenomenon in Niger and many other countries in West Af-
rica. In Niger, the repressive military regimes that had dominated post-
independence governance generally permitted the existence of only one 
                                                                                                             
d’application de l’article 20.1 d l’Ordonnance no 84–06 du 1er mars 1984, portant regime 
des Associations [Decree no. 92-292/PM/MF/P of September 25, 1992] (Republique du 
Niger) (laying out a streamlined process for the recognition and monitoring of domestic 
and foreign NGOs and describing their rights and responsibilities). 
 63. Interview with Madam Sayo Aysatu, Directrisse de Direction des Liberte 
Publique, Direction Generale des Affaires Politiques et Juridiques, Ministere de 
l’Interieur et de La Decentralization, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 4, 2004) (interview notes on 
file with author). Copies of the unofficial annual list of NGO registrations are on file with 
the author. 
 64. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 7. 
 65. See Working in Partnership, ANTI-SLAVERY ORG., 
http://www.antislavery.org/english/what_we_do/working_in_partnership.aspx (last visit-
ed May 16, 2011). 
 66. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 34 (indicating that the early 
pro-democracy movement in Niger was propelled by French educated elites, but that 
religious organizations gradually gained influence). 
 67. Id. at 8; see also Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid, A Civil Society in Egypt?, 47 MIDDLE E. 
J. 228, 228–229, 239  (1993) (describing how the opening of civil society in Egypt and 
several other North African countries led to increasingly voluble participation by “intol-
erant” Islamic organizations). 
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Islamic religious organization in the public sphere—the Association Is-
lamique du Niger (“AIN”)—and carefully controlled its activities and 
pronouncements.68 The creation of a freewheeling civil society sector, 
however, gave rise to a democratization of religion and a new profusion 
of religious organizations. Under the new rules of the game, not only was 
the AIN able to express its views without government approval or cen-
sure, but a welter of religious actors began to vie to put forward popular 
visions of what a just, democratic, Islamic society would look like.69 
While the new multitude of Islamic associations represented a multiplici-
ty of competing views on the true meaning of Islam, they quickly real-
ized that any position labeled “Muslim” would strike a responsive chord 
in a country where the overwhelming majority of the population profess-
es that religion.70 To the extent they could coalesce around certain public 
policy or legal principles and speak with one voice, they could impose 
their will in open civil society debates.71 
C. Civil Society Showdown(s) Over Family Law 
In Niger and nearby African countries,72 the fiercest debates between 
secular, Western-oriented, human rights-based civil society groups on 
one hand, and Islamic religious organizations on the other, concerned the 
proposed reform of family laws.73 For Western-oriented democracy ac-
tivists, the development of a modern “family code” was a fundamental 
ingredient in the development of a democracy. By “modern,” the democ-
racy activists generally meant “French” family laws based upon univer-
sal human rights principles such as equal inheritance for women, a wom-
                                                                                                             
 68. Villalón, Moral and the Political, supra note 53; see also Chazan, supra note 25, 
at 285 (describing a post-Independence phenomenon common in Africa whereby states 
permitted some voluntary associations to form but limited them in number and carefully 
controlled their activities). 
 69. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 10–11. 
 70. Villalón, Moral and the Political, supra note 53, at 56. See generally Léon 
Buskens, Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in 
an Emerging Public Sphere, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 70 (2003) (describing attempts in 
Morocco to modernize family law and institute civil society where multitudinous, com-
peting Islamic organizations entered the sector and tested “the limits of freedom of 
speech”). 
 71. See Schulz, supra note 21, at 145 (noting that in Mali, Muslim groups that nor-
mally competed with one another came together to effectively block Western women’s 
rights and family law reforms). 
 72. See Buskens, supra note 70, at 71 (describing political and religious struggles 
over family law in Morocco); Schulz, supra note 21, at 132–33. 
 73. See id. at 122 (stating that in Morocco, the reform of family law became a symbol 
of the place of Islam in society). 
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an’s right to consent to marriage (and to decline to engage in polygamous 
marriage), and the equal right to seek divorce and to retain custody of 
minor children.74 
But these Western conceived rights (and the Western-funded efforts to 
implement them)75 were and are in tension with Islamic and customary76 
Nigerien social and legal traditions that grant husbands superior rights in 
the context of marriage relations. For example, Muslim law stipulates 
that a son’s inheritance should be twice that of a daughter’s.77 In addi-
tion, the Koran explicitly permits men to engage in polygamous marriage 
and makes it much harder for a woman to obtain a divorce than a man.78 
In Niger and other Islamic African countries, these gender-imbalanced 
legal traditions generally have been upheld by state legal authorities, who 
are permitted by statute to diverge from formal state codes and instead 
rule on family law matters according to custom.79 Quite clearly, includ-
ing “universally accepted” notions of gender equality in the fundamental 
laws that would give shape to Niger’s new democracy was going to re-
quire deft cultural, religious, and political maneuvering by the country’s 
secular, Western-oriented civil society actors. 
Ultimately, they failed. The French-style family code was placed on 
the agenda by Niger’s transitional government as one of the fundamental 
texts that had to be elaborated in building the legal infrastructure for the 
new democracy, but it was blocked by Islamic actors’ effective political 
                                                                                                             
 74. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 24. 
 75. See Schulz, supra note 21, at 142 (noting that in Mali, efforts to reform family 
law were pushed by women activist groups that were heavily subsidized by Western do-
nor organizations). 
 76. It is far beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to disentangle Islamic law on 
one hand and non-Islamic African customary law on the other. It must suffice to say that 
in Niger and other West African countries, both exist but they overlap significantly. In 
many instances, Islamic law is more protective (at least from a Western perspective) of 
women’s rights than customary law. To take an example from southwestern Niger, Islam-
ic law permits a female descendant to inherit a half share of her father’s real and personal 
property, while customary law forbids her to inherit any rights in real property. In Niger 
and elsewhere in West Africa, state courts are often empowered to take customary law 
into account, particularly in matters of family law, and those courts typically apply an 
unpredictable blend of Islamic and customary law. See generally Kelley, supra note 50, 
at 645–51. 
 77. Villalón, Moral and the Political, supra note 52. 
 78. Id. at 52; see also, Patterson, supra note 20, at 427 (noting that social norms in 
patrilineal Africa generally limit women’s access to property, education and credit, and 
prevent them from participating fully in public life); Schulz, supra note 21, at 140 (noting 
that in Mali, women owe a legal right of obedience to their husbands). 
 79. See Schulz, supra note 21, at 140–41 (describing courts’ enforcement of custom-
ary laws in Mali that generally favor the rights of men over women). 
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organization and agitation in the civil society sector.80 To oversimplify a 
protracted political and cultural battle that unfolded over a period of sev-
eral years, Islamic organizations took advantage of the new civil society 
infrastructure to organize themselves and to loudly proclaim, and mobi-
lize public support for, the notion that the supposedly universal rights 
enshrined in the proposed family code were un-Islamic and/or part of a 
Western neo-imperialist project.81 The Islamic actors won popular sup-
port,82 overwhelmed the Western-educated, secular-leaning organizations 
such as ANDDH, and blocked the reform legislation.83 
In the end, a legislative reform effort aimed primarily at increasing 
women’s standing in society opened up a field for conservative religious 
forces to mobilize popular discontent by entering the civil society sec-
tor—with its freedom of expression and of association—and offering a 
vision of Islamic cultural autonomy as an alternative to political depend-
ence on the West. The internationally sponsored promotion of women’s 
rights not only offered a new rallying ground for conservative opposi-
tional forces, but ended by endowing them with greater moral authority 
and greater standing in the emerging African democracies.84 
III. CONCLUSION 
Western countries’ plans to engender civil society in West African na-
tions as an essential component of democratization and liberalization 
contained an inescapable conundrum: the only way we could create a 
civil society in Islamic West Africa—at least a civil society in our own 
secular, human rights-based image—was to do it over the objections of 
the Islamic majority; in a word, to do it undemocratically. 
We in the Global North assumed that if we coached emerging African 
democracies through the process of establishing truly democratic politi-
                                                                                                             
 80. See id. at 137 (noting that Muslim activists in Mali were able to blunt political 
westernization by “successfully appeal[ing] to an alternative normative order,” particular-
ly among the lower classes). 
 81. See id. at 133 (noting that Islamic actors defeated family law reform in Mali part-
ly by portraying it as an example of Western imperialism); see also Buskens, supra note 
70, at 95, 100, 102 (describing the same dynamic in the context of family law reform 
efforts in Morocco). 
 82. See Schulz, supra note 21, at 159 (noting that in Mali many Islamic women lined 
up publicly against the legal reforms that would have put them on equal legal footing 
with men). 
 83. Villalón, Argument to Negotiation, supra note 52, at 24–25; see also Schulz, 
supra note 21, at 133 (stating that Islam took over the “center-stage” in Mali’s moves 
toward political modernity). 
 84. See Schulz, supra note 21, at 163. 
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cal institutions, including free and fair elections and broad freedoms of 
expression and assembly, the people, often organized and represented by 
their NGOs, inevitably would choose legal and social structures much 
like our own. Not only would contract rights and property rights be pro-
tected, but individual rights, most notably women’s rights to equal treat-
ment under law, would become sacrosanct. This is not what happened. 
The people, who assembled in the physical and metaphorical space of the 
civil society sector, vigorously debated whether to institute Western-style 
laws to govern family life and other sectors of their societies, and decid-
ed—democratically—that they preferred their own, non-Western, largely 
Islamic laws and traditions. 
This leads to the ultimate question posed by this paper. What if any-
thing should western proponents of civil society do about it? When we 
promote civil society and democracy in Africa and other parts of the de-
veloping world, are we satisfied by democratic procedures; that is, by 
open debate and free and fair elections followed by the implementation 
of laws that a majority of the population has endorsed?85 More to the 
point, is it acceptable if the democratically determined social order and 
legal system adopted by those countries lacks the recognition and protec-
tion of the universal human rights that we hold dear?86 
Or did we mean something different, something more normatively 
substantive, when we said we wanted to guide developing countries to-
ward civil society and democracy? Are western-oriented NGOs inescap-
ably necessary to the development of civil society and democracy, and 
are there certain unequivocal, universal, inalienable rights that all democ-
racies must recognize and protect, including women’s right to equality 
under law?87 
The answer to these fundamental questions is the topic for a book, or a 
series of books, not a brief symposium article. However, my initial re-
sponse is that there is little that western governments and aid organiza-
tions can do to prevent the civil society sphere in West Africa from 
evolving in its own direction. Having supported the implementation of 
structures that permit, even encourage, open, society-wide debate about 
the nature of justice and governance, it is impractical, and frankly, un-
seemly for westerners to attempt to intervene when we disapprove of the 
principles and structures that our ostensible tutees have devised. 
                                                                                                             
 85. See Patterson, supra note 20, at 424 (defining democracy as a procedure in which 
individuals are free to participate and have the means to hold their leaders accountable). 
 86. See Villalón, Moral and the Political, supra note 86. 
 87. See id. at 42 (arguing that democratization has come to imply a package of uni-
versalist human rights concerns). 
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Besides, the ultimate result may not be bad, even from a western per-
spective. Although Islamic actors have had an outsized influence on the 
shape of civil society and other democratic institutions in West Africa, 
there is no reason to believe that the end result of the democratic contes-
tation in the civil society sector will be a conservative, closed Islamic 
republic along the lines of Iran or Saudi Arabia or Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan. 
This is because in Niger and elsewhere in Islamic West Africa, the 
metes and bounds of the religious subsector within civil society are open 
to vigorous, democratic debate and contestation. While it is true that the 
story of Niger’s family code showed what can happen when Islamic 
forces coalesce around a particular issue, there is in Niger and elsewhere 
in West Africa roiling debate and contestation surrounding the interpreta-
tion of the Koran and other holy texts and how they should (or should 
not) be applied in the public sphere. 88  This “constructive fragmenta-
tion”89 of Islamic religious debate is likely to increase as literacy rates 
rise90 and as freedom of expression continues to permit broad participa-
tion in political discourses. 
In sum, there is an emerging Muslim public sphere in West Africa and 
a general, society-wide reconsideration of the role of Islam in these 
emerging democratic societies.91 The end result of the open debates will 
very likely not result in a civil society dominated by NGOs dedicated to 
protecting universal human rights. Nor, however, is it likely to result in 
closed, repressive Islamic societies. Having jumpstart a dynamic process 
of democratic change, civil society proponents from the West are proba-
bly going to have to allow it to play out. They can attempt to influence 
the debates. They can even insist that the NGOs that they fund adhere to 
western values and to western conceived “best practices” for civil society 
actors. But, as recent struggles in West Africa have shown, they are very 
unlikely to succeed in determining the outcomes of the processes that 
they set in motion, and they probably should not try. We can hope that 
the promotion of civil society will lead toward just and stable societies, 
but we should accept that this may look little like our own. 
 
                                                                                                             
 88. See Eickelman, supra note 25, at 124–25, 130. 
 89. Id. at 129. 
 90. Id. at 124–25. 
 91. Id. at 130. 
